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This Time?
Lee C. Buchheit
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New York
[Author's Note: This article is based upon the author's lecture entitled
"The Next Wave of Cross-Border Lending" delivered in connection
with the Meredith Lectures at McGill University in April 1994.* The
subject of that lecture, and of this article, is how cross-border lending
to less developed countries (LDCs) in the 1990s differs from the last
major period of such lending in the late 1970s. It is surely a testament
to the accelerated obsolescence of modem financial commentary that
the author's April 1994 lecture - delivered in the middle of a boom
in cross-border lending - has already been followed by a bust start-
ing in late December 1994 when Mexico devalued its currency, and by
tentative signs of yet another resurgence in cross-border capital flows
in the second half of 1995.]
INTRODUCTION
When financial historians come to explain the behavior of cross-
border investors in the last decade of this millennium, they will have
to begin with the statistics. Aggregate net long-term resource flows to
developing countries from private sources exceeded $159 billion in
1993 and $170 billion in 1994; roughly a fourfold increase over the
five-year period since 1989.1 Portfolio equity flows increased more
* That lecture was subsequently published by Les tditions Yvon Blais (Cowansville, Que-
bec, Canada 1994) in Les Transactions TransfrontalidresICross Border Transactions. Les Editions
Yvon Blais have kindly consented to the use of the text in preparing this article.




than thirteenfold from $3.5 billion in 1989 to $47 billion in 1993.2
Bond placements by developing country borrowers aggregated ap-
proximately $59 billion in 1993. The comparable figure for 1989 was
about $5.5 billion.4
One London-based securities firm calculated that $160 billion of
emerging market equity shares were held by international investors in
1994. Seven years earlier, that number was $2.4 billion.
5
Anyone who tried to book a business class seat on an airplane to
Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Manila or dozens of other LDC capitals in
1993 or 1994 could supply anecdotal evidence supporting these statis-
tics. For the prior ten years, those seats were occupied mostly by mel-
ancholy country debt negotiators, visibly licking wounds received at
the hands of creditor committees in New York or London. In the
1990s, those same seats have been booked by eager young investment
and commercial bankers clutching mandates for new Eurobonds,
global depositary receipt issues, Euroconvertibles and so forth, or by
mutual fund managers checking on the performance of their LDC
investments.
THE CYCLES OF CROSs-BORDER LENDING
The history of cross-border lending teaches caution. At irregular
intervals over the last two centuries, public and private sector borrow-
ers in developing countries have been received with enthusiasm by the
international capital markets. The 1820s, the 1880s, the years before
the First World War, the 1920s and, most recently, the 1970s, were all
periods of massive international lending to developing economies.
Each lending boom, however, was usually followed by a period of
painful retrenchment, disillusionment and recrimination. Some of the
creditors saw their loans rescheduled on concessionary terms; others
saw them repudiated or treated with malign neglect.6 After the pas-
sage of a few decades, however, memories would fade, optimism
2 Id. at 14.
3 Nrr'L MONmTARY FUND, PrVATE MARKET FnANCING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 PIrvATE MARKET FINANcING].
4 INT'L MoNrARY FuND, PRIvATE MARKET FinANCiNG FOR DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES 18,
Table 8 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 PRIVATE MARKET FiNANCINrG].
5 Stephen Fidler, A Bubble Borne Along on a Wave of Money, FIN. TrMIs, Feb. 3, 1994, at
15.
6 There is considerable literature on the boom and bust cycles of cross-border lending. See,
ag., EDwiN BoRcHARD & WmLTAm H. WYNm, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIN BONDEOLD-
Es (1951) [hereinafter STATE INSOLVENCY]; Tm INTERNATONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPEcrIVE (Barry Eichengreen & William H. Wynne eds., 1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
DEBT CRISIS]; FRANK GmF rrH DAWSON, THm FmsT LATIN AimiuCAN DEBT CRISIS (1990).
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would again triumph over experience and a new cycle of cross-border
lending would begin.
The last major financial hangover started in August of 1982 when
Mexico declared a moratorium on the repayment of certain categories
of its external debt. In the following decade, $400 billion or so of debt
obligations incurred by dozens of countries were repeatedly resched-
uled and, in the end, partially written off under the auspices of the so-
called Brady Initiative.7 This process is still not complete in some
countries.8 As the figures quoted above show, however, a new wave
of cross-border capital flows to developing countries has come crash-
ing ashore in the 1990s onto beaches not yet fully cleared of the jetsam
of the last inundation.
WHAT'S Dn RENT THIs TIME?
The cynic might say that the desire for higher yields always has,
and always will, unseat prudence and caution in international lending.
It is an appealing explanation. The fascination of investors with the
so-called emerging markets in 1992 and 1993 can be attributed in large
part to the investors' dissatisfaction with the available yields on do-
mestic investments. 9 The marked slowdown in cross-border capital
flows in late 1994 (in comparison with the prior two years), even
before the Mexican devaluation in December 1994, was a direct result
of the significant interest rate increases in the United States starting in
February of that year.' 0 But this cannot be the complete story. Mem-
ories, after all, are not that short and the spreads on new developing
market issues are not that high."
7 Lee C. Buchheit, The Background to Brady's Initiative, INT'L FIN. L. REV., April 1990, at
29.
8 Panama, Peru and Russia, among others, have not yet finalized comprehensive commer-
cial bank debt rescheduling packages.
9 See Steven Greenhouse, Third World Markets Gain Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at
D1; Junk Bonds Emerging, Converging, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29-Feb. 4, 1994, at 79; Jacqueline Do-
herty and Candace Cumberbatch, Colombia to Sell Yankee Bonds, With Investors Ready to Buy
Amid a Shortage of New Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1994, at C20 (quoting a portfolio manager
as saying "You're getting 50% more yield spread [with Colombia Yankee bonds] than similarly
rated U.S. corporate bonds."); High Yield, Not Love of Mexico, Drove Country's Yen Duel, LDC
DEBT REPT., July 31, 1995, at 1.
10 Michael R. Sesit, Foreign Stocks, Bonds Are Losing Their Appeal for American Buyers,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1995, at C1.
11 See Yield Spread at Launch for Unenhanced Bond Issues By Developing Countries and
Regions, 1995 PRIVATE MARKET FINANCING, supra note 3, at 62, Table A6 (showing that aver-
age yield spread for LDC bonds, expressed as the basis point difference between the bond yield
at issue and the prevailing yield for industrial country government bonds in the same currency,
declined from 346 basis points in 1991 to 187 basis points in the first quarter of 1994).
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The broader explanation is that the historical cycles of cross-bor-
der lending have not all been alike. New investors quite naturally fo-
cus on the changes that have occurred since the last cycle as the basis
for their hope that this time things will turn out better. The interna-
tional lending activity of the first half of this decade, for example, is
significantly different in a number of respects from its counterpart in
the 1970s. Have these changes removed the risks of cross-border
lending? No. Have they diluted or significantly attenuated those
risks? Perhaps. Have they altered the nature of the risks? Almost
certainly they have.
International investors, like old generals, suffer from the tempta-
tion to fight the last war over again. Those who are prepared in the
1990s to commit their capital to the developing world have carefully
studied the history of their immediate predecessors. They have extra-
polated from the dolorous history of the 1980s certain lessons as to
when cross-border credits are likely to be repaid and when they are
not. Much of the cross-border lending in this decade will bear the
stamp of these perceived lessons.
What has changed? How is the current pattern of cross-border
lending different from that of the 1970s?
Nature of Investors. Most of the lending to lesser developed
countries during the 1970s took the form of syndicated commercial
bank loans. The banks were happy to intermediate between
Euromarket depositors (particularly petrodollar depositors after the
oil shocks in 1976 and 1979) and the ultimate LDC borrowers. One
consequence of this credit intermediation, of course, was to place the
stability of the commercial banking systems of the creditor countries
uncomfortably at risk when the debtors' moratorium telexes came cas-
cading across telex machines in 1982 and 1983. The resulting debt re-
negotiations were therefore matters of intense concern to the
governments of the creditor countries and these governments did not
hesitate to intervene in the negotiation process when they felt it ap-
propriate to do so.
12
In contrast, cross-border lending in this decade will take place
principally through the medium of the international bond markets.'3
Apart from those few hours in each transaction when the underwriters
actually own the bonds, the credit risk of the borrower is nowadays
passed through to the ultimate investor (the bondholder) with all pos-
12 Lee C. Buchheit, A Change of Hat, Irr'L FiN. L. REv., June 1990, at 12.
13 1 WoRLD BANK, WoRLD DEBT TABLEs 1993-94 20-22 (1993) [hereinafter 1993-94 DEBT
TABLEs].
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sible speed. If future events were to force issuers to default on these
bonds en masse, a great many investors might lose their money but the
full weight of the problem would not fall again on commercial banks,
their regulators and their government-sponsored deposit insurance
agencies.
The shift away from commercial bank lending, however, raises a
different set of worries. However ill-advised some of their lending de-
cisions may have turned out, international commercial banks were
presumed to understand the special risks that attend cross-border
lending. Some of these banks had branches or representative offices
in the debtor countries and they were thus in a position to assess first-
hand the local political and economic scene. A similar presumption
cannot be made about bondholders. Even sophisticated institutional
investors may lack the background and resources needed to assess all
of the elements of cross-border risk.' 4 These risks may take the form
of exchange controls, exchange rate movements, wars, rebellions,
coups d'etat, shifts in commodity prices, political instability, expropria-
tions, nationalizations, trade imbalances, corruption, inefficiency, dis-
crimination against foreign investors and a host of other nasty
circumstances that can separate the unwary international investor
from his money. Even the shrewdest domestic investor may be unpre-
pared for everything that can go wrong in a cross-border context.
Nature of the Instruments. Unsecured, medium-term, commercial
bank syndicated loans are out of vogue, at least in the context of LDC
financing. 5 Syndicated loans showed themselves to be uncomfortably
susceptible to rescheduling during the 1980s. The lenders were easily
identifiable, could be contacted at the end of a telex line and were
expected to behave with maturity and forbearance in the face of dis-
appointing news from the borrowers. Publicly-issued debt instru-
ments, on the other hand, were almost never rescheduled during the
last debt crisis. The Eurobonds and floating rate note issues of most
countries were consciously excluded from the restructuring exercises
and were paid on time in full.'
6
14 Kenneth N. Gilpin, New Third World Fear: Investors Could Walk Away, N.Y. TnrAFs, Apr.
24, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter GItPN].
15 See 1993-94 DEBT TABLEs, supra note 13, at 25 ("As in previous years, access to syndi-
cated bank credit was severely restricted for developing countries that had experienced, or are
experiencing, debt-servicing difficulties").
16 A notable exception was Costa Rica whose commercial bank Steering Committee in 1982
pressured the country into rescheduling its bonds. See Costa Rica: A Case History, DEFAULT
AND REsCHEDULING 141, 149-50 (D. Suratgar ed. 1984). See also, S.M. Yassukovich, Eurobonds
and Debt Rescheduling, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1982, at 61. Notwithstanding this history, a Costa
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Investors in the 1990s take comfort from this recent practice of
excluding bonds from the unpleasantries of debt restructurings. This
is one important reason why investors are prepared to buy emerging
market bonds, even if they might recoil at the idea of buying interests
in syndicated bank loans to the same borrowers. 17 If these investors
believe, however, that the nature of the instrument (a bond versus a
loan) is sufficient, by itself, to insulate the holder from the thousand
shocks to which the international lending flesh is heir, they are mis-
taken. The main reason why bonds were not rescheduled in the 1980s
was that there were not very many of them. LDC borrowers had been
able to satisfy most of their financing needs during the 1970s from the
commercial bank loan market. Publicly-issued bonds were the excep-
tion and, frankly, it was not generally thought worth the effort to try
to reschedule them in light of the limited debt relief that could be
achieved from such an exercise.'
8
Many sovereign borrowers also recognized that commercial
banks could not be counted on as a reliable source of financing during
the first few years following the end of the debt crisis. By maintaining
punctual debt servicing of outstanding bonds, these countries hoped
to keep the international bond markets sweet for an eventual re-entry
by the sovereign borrowers following the crisis. It was a sound strat-
egy and has been amply rewarded by the bond markets.
The situation has largely reversed itself in this decade. Bank
loans are now the exception and bonds are the lending instrument of
choice in LDC financing. A borrower that experiences financial diffi-
culties in the future may find that its aggregate stock of bond indebt-
edness is simply too large to be ignored or excluded from a request for
debt relief. An attempt to reschedule such instruments may therefore
be inevitable for some countries, however formidable may be the
practical difficulties of rescheduling bearer instruments.' 9 In a per-
verse way it is the popularity of bonds with today's investors'- a
Rican public sector issuer was well-received by the Eurobond market in early 1994. See CR
Makes a Comeback, INT'L FINANcING REV., Jan. 22, 1994, at 46.
17 An example of this sentiment may be found in a paper published by Morgan Stanley in
February 1991 entitled Mexican Brady Bonds (at 17): "Mexico is unlikely to default on its bonds
given that it did not do so during its worst economic times." A paper published by Salomon
Brothers dated March 16, 1993, entitled Evaluating Sovereign Credit Risk (at 22) reached a simi-
lar conclusion: "[I]n the sovereign markets, bond debt is de facto senior to bank loans.... By
this we mean that since World War II, sovereigns that have rescheduled bank loans have not
rescheduled bonds."
18 See Lee C. Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INT'L FIN. L. Rnv., June 1991,
at 12-13.
19 See Watkins, How to Reschedule a Bond Issue, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1983, at 103.
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popularity reflecting the recent history of not rescheduling bonds -
that may force these instruments to be rescheduled if countries run
into financial difficulties in the future.
Nature of the Borrowers. Investors in the 1990s have a preference
for private sector borrowers.20  The naked balance of payments
financings for sovereign borrowers that characterized the late 1970s
are now distinctly out of favor.21
This preference for private sector borrowers makes obvious sense
in cases where the borrower has assets or receivables outside the
debtor country that could be seized by the creditors in the event of a
default, or in cases where the borrower has a foreign parent to whom
the lenders may look for repayment should the borrower/subsidiary
fail (or be unable as a result of exchange controls) to repay the debt.'
Apart from these situations, however, investors who study the 1980s
will learn that private sector borrowers, however solvent, were usually
swept up in the debt problems of their governments. Most sovereign
borrowers refused to sell foreign exchange to private sector borrowers
to permit those entities to service their foreign loans except on terms
equivalent to the treatment accorded to the government's own credi-
tors. Thus, a bad credit decision in respect of a private sector bor-
rower (that is, a loan to a borrower that subsequently went bankrupt)
usually resulted in a loss to the lender, but a good credit decision (that
is, a loan to a financially healthy private sector borrower) typically
earned for the lender only the same treatment as he would have re-
ceived had he originally lent to the government itself or to a public
sector borrower.
Interest Rate Bases. One benefit of the LDCs' return to the bond
markets is the preference of those markets for fixed rate instruments.
Commercial bank lending during the 1970s, on the other hand, was
almost exclusively based on floating interest rate bases such as the
20 See 1993 Private Market Financing, supra note 4, at 19, "Private sector issuers accounted
for an increasing share of developing country bond issues in 1992, representing 42 percent of
total issuance activity, compared with 31 percent in 1991 and 8 percent in 1989." Int'l Monetary
Fund, International Capital Markets, Part II. Systemic Issues in International Finance 50 (1993).
21 Wolf, Private Flows After Mexico, FIN. TrMEs, Jan. 21, 1995, at 15, col. 5. ("In 1993, 95 per
cent of net private finance flowed to the private sector, while 70 per cent of net long-term flows
to developing countries were from private sources to private users, up from 45 per cent in
1990.")
22 The rating agencies, however, still generally recognize a "sovereign ceiling" on credit rat-
ings for private sector borrowers. That is, a private sector borrower, however solvent, will not be
given a credit rating higher than that of its host country absent off-shore assets or a solicitous




London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR"). When LIBOR rose to
about 20% p.a. in the early 1980s, this vastly increased the debt ser-
vice burdens of LDC borrowers and was a proximate cause of the last
debt crisis.23
Use of Proceeds. If one looks at the reasons why some LDC bor-
rowers have sought to disavow their international debt obligations
over the last two centuries, perhaps the most common explanation is
that the proceeds of the disputed financings did not contribute to the
common weal in the debtor countries. It is one thing to contemplate
repudiating a loan that found its way into the Swiss bank accounts of
the government officials who approved the borrowing, or which fi-
nanced the construction of a wholly decorative monument to the pre-
vious dictator.24 It is quite another thing for a sovereign to question
its moral obligation to repay a debt that clearly benefited the recipient
country and its people. With this history in mind, today's investors
prefer to see the proceeds of their credits used for productive (i.e.
morally defensible) purposes.5
Economic Reforms. The debt restructuring programs of the
1980s were usually carried out in conjunction with IMF-sponsored
economic stabilization and adjustment programs. Most of the coun-
tries that have come through the restructuring process, therefore, have
done so with economies that have benefited from major structural
reforms.
In the years immediately following the end of the debt crisis for
many of these countries (1991-94), economic policy in the countries
was guided by foreign-trained technocrats who openly embraced the
objectives of free trade, sound money, low inflation and a reduced
level of state involvement in the economy. These policies are pre-
cisely what foreign investors want to see in developing economies and
the international capital markets readily (too readily as it turned out)
interpreted them as a sign that the risk of economic mismanagement
had receded to a point that was no longer worrisome.
26
23 See generally, Lindert, Response to Debt Crisis: What Is Different About the 1980s? in
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS, supra note 6, at 229-234.
24 See generally, Thomas Walde, The Sanctity of Debt and Insolvent Countries: Defenses of
Debtors in International Loan Agreements, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
DEBT OBIIATIONS 119, 124-29 (David M. Sassoon & Daniel D. Bradlow, eds., 1987).
25 See Moffett, Latin Nations Open Up to Long-Term Foreign Capital, WALL ST. J., June 23,
1995, at A10, col. 1.
26 See Krugman, Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets, FOREIGN AFFAmS, July/Aug. 1995, at
28. Krugman describes the so-called "Washington consensus" regarding LDC economic policies
that developed in the early 1990s as: "Liberalize trade, privatize state enterprises, balance the
budget, peg the exchange rate, and one will have laid the foundations for an economic takeoff;
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Available Information. One explanation for why commercial
banks overlent to the developing world during the 1970s is that the
banks had remarkably little information about the economies of the
debtor countries, their balance of payments positions, investment in-
flows, aggregate external debt, international reserves and so forth.
When the crisis broke in 1982, some banks proclaimed that they would
never have lent so much money to LDCs had they known that every-
body else was lending so much money to LDCs.
High on the banks' list of priorities during the ensuing debt
restructurings, therefore, was a requirement that the sovereign bor-
rowers provide to the creditors exceptionally detailed economic infor-
mation on a regular basis. The format for this reporting closely (and
deliberately) tracked the reports that are submitted to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund by its member countries. Most countries that
have gone through a generalized debt restructuring over the past dec-
ade prepare and distribute booklets to their creditors on a quarterly
basis containing these economic and financial statistics.'
A new organization, the Institute of International Finance (IIF),
was established in 1983 for the purpose of analyzing and reporting to
its members on economic and financial developments in borrowing
countries.2 The IIF now has more than 170 banks and financial insti-
tutions as members, as well as investment banks, trading houses and
export credit agencies as associate members.
Remedies. Until the middle of the 20th century, a lender ex-
tending credit to a foreign sovereign did so with no expectation that
he could compel repayment of the debt by legal means. Most coun-
tries recognized an "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity under
which a foreign sovereign could not be sued in the national courts of
another country without its express consent. Unless the debtor gov-
ernment could be sued in its own courts (an unlikely scenario), the
only remedies available to disappointed lenders in the past were
find a country that has done these things, and there one may confidently expect to realize high
returns on investments." Id. at 29.
27 See Gilpin, supra note 14, quoting a senior Mexican official as saying that "The explosion
of information is the biggest change that has happened" since the debt crisis started. But see,
Michael Gonzalez, Mexico's Mysteries Frustrate Wall Street, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1995, at A6,
col. 1. ("Analysts complain that, after a brief period of supplying better economic and financial
data, Mexican bureaucrats are backsliding, either dragging their feet on requests for information
or refusing outright to supply it."), and for a response from the Mexican Ministry of France, see
No More Mysteries about Mexico Economy - a letter of Alejandro Valenzuela, WALL ST. J., July
28, 1995, at A15, col. 1.
28 Walter Sterling Surrey & Peri N. Nash, Bankers Look Beyond the Debt Crisis: The Insti-
tute of International Finance, Inc., 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111 (1984).
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moral suasion, diplomatic pressure (if the lenders' own governments
were prepared to get involved) and threats to shut off additional
credit unless outstanding obligations were honored.2 9 In cases where
the creditors' plight coincided with their governments' geopolitical in-
terests, an occasional resort to the gunboat or to military intervention
might be possible.
Most creditor countries now recognize a restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity under which foreign sovereigns engaged in commer-
cial activity abroad may be sued in the national courts of other
countries.30 Borrowing money in the international capital markets is
considered a commercial activity for this purpose. In the United
States, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was codified in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and in the United King-
dom in the State Immunity Act 1978. Drafters of credit agreements
and bond indentures for sovereign borrowers and government-owned
enterprises also routinely include express waivers of any immunities to
which the borrowers may be entitled.
The cross-border lenders of the late 1970s thus had every reason
to expect that their contracts with foreign borrowers could be en-
forced in courts of their own choosing. In practice, however, litigation
was not attempted, except in rare instances, as a means for resolving
the debt crisis. Several reasons have been advanced to explain this
forbearance: the brotherhood of bankers, the fear of prompting a
raised eyebrow of disapproval by one's regulator, and a recognition
that any widespread resort to lawsuits would jeopardize the renegoti-
ation process and force borrowers into a bunker mentality. Whatever
the explanation, however, the creditors caught up in the last debt crisis
did not try to sue their way out of it.
31
Will the lenders of the 1990s be as tolerant? Those who believe
that publicly-issued bonds will always be treated as a preferred cate-
gory of debt and will be serviced faithfully even if other obligations go
into default would presumably answer this question by saying that to-
day's lenders will never be given any provocation to sue. If this faith
proves misplaced, however, the conventional wisdom is that bond-
holders are a less tractable lot than commercial banks. Public bond-
holders are not regulated entities like banks. They are less susceptible
to government pressure. They cannot be expected to agonize over the
29 See STATE INSOLVENCY, supra note 6, at Part IV.
30 JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONs 3-
8 (1988).
31 See Avoiding the Nightmare Scenario, INr'L FINANCIAL L. REV., Aug. 1992, at 19.
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geopolitical consequences of their actions in the same way as the in-
ternational banking community, and, bluntly put, there are thousands
upon thousands of them out there who could potentially cause
trouble. If debt problems were to recur in some of the developing
countries, it is not at all clear that negotiated solutions could be pur-
sued without the threat of harassing litigation by some creditors.
Disclosure. One important difference between borrowing money
through a bond issue rather than a loan agreement is that the former
will trigger the application of the securities laws in the countries in
which the investors reside. Even if the transaction is structured to
take advantage of an exemption from registration of the offering be-
cause the securities are sold privately to a limited number of sophisti-
cated investors, the issuer will nevertheless be obliged to prepare and
distribute a disclosure document of some kind. These disclosure doc-
uments, whether they are styled as prospectuses, offering circulars or
information memoranda, are a significant feature distinguishing the
cross-border lending activity of the 1990s from that of the 1970s.
CONCLUSION
Taking all these factors together, does today's cross-border lender
stand a better chance of getting repaid, in full and on time, than did
his predecessor in less enlightened times like the 1970s? Perhaps so.
One thing seems certain however: the extrapolation of simple lessons
from the last wave of cross-border lending is hazardous. The circum-
stances under which cross-border lending takes place today are signifi-
cantly different from cross-border lending twenty years ago. One
consequence of this, of course, is that the resolution of future LDC
debt problems, if such problems recur, may also be very different from
the methods used to resolve the debt crisis of the 1980s. 32
The integration of the world's financial markets over the last
twenty years is perhaps the single most important change in cross-
border lending. Money can flow into and out of economies with
astonishing speed.33 The markets reassess a country's investment cli-
mate - interest rates, exchange rates, political factors, domestic eco-
nomic policies, trade flows and commodity prices - on a daily or
even hourly basis. The period of time between the markets' identifi-
cation of an investment opportunity in a particular country and the
32 See Rory MacMillan, Proposals for Sovereign Debt Workout Systems, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. (forthcoming March 1996).
33 Michael R. Sesit, Mexico's Economic Troubles a Reminder of Risks in Emerging-Market
Investments, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1994, at C1, col. 1.
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flow of funds into that economy may be very short. Conversely, any
diminution in investor confidence can be reflected in massive and im-
mediate shifts of capital to the detriment of the developing country
borrower.34 Cross-border lenders in the 1990s hope that their borrow-
ers understand these changed circumstances. In an era when good
behavior toward one's creditors is rewarded with access to large and
beneficent capital markets, and misbehavior can be punished instanta-
neously by a withdrawal of capital and restricted market access, the
borrowers are expected to internalize the right lessons.35
That, in any event, is the theory. There are two worrisome quali-
fications. First, despite the sometimes frantic efforts of finance minis-
ters to distance their countries in the minds of investors from some of
their brethren who may be experiencing a reversal of fortune,36 the
markets are still not very discriminating in this regard. Mexico's de-
valuation in December 1994 produced what came to be called the Te-
quila Effect felt throughout the emerging markets. 37 Therefore, no
matter how prudent, disciplined and conservative the economic poli-
cies of a particular developing country may be, the markets may unin-
tentionally punish that country for the sins of its LDC cousins
elsewhere. If this trend persists, it will severely weaken the argument
that good behavior will inevitably bring good rewards.
Second, free-market technocrats have risen to prominence in
many developing countries. These individuals understand what inter-
national fund managers expect in terms of economic and financial pol-
icies, and they are often personally convinced that such policies are
necessary for a country's longer-term prosperity. The challenge in the
balance of this decade, however, will be to persuade the citizenry of
some developing countries that these longer-term objectives are worth
more near-term sacrifices.38 This may be a difficult sell in countries
that endured nearly a decade of economic contraction in the 1980s
and where the brief return to the sunshine of creditor approval in
34 See Friedland, Peso Crisis Highlights Diminished Roles of IMF, World Bank in Latin
America, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1995, at A13, col. 3; Fidler, More Liberal Flow of Funds Creates
Instability, FIN. Thdis, Jan. 27, 1995, at 4, col. 1; Carrington, Private-Capital Flows Can Hurt
Poor Nations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at Al, col. 5.
35 "IT]he markets will begin to exert more discipline on these countries," an investment
manager has been quoted as saying. "If people don't like a particular policy, they will react to it,
and exert a rather severe penalty on local securities markets." Gilpin, supra note 14, at 4.
36 Foster, We Are Not Like Mexico, Plead Brazilians, FIN. TimEs, Jan. 12, 1995, at 5, col. 1.
37 Latin America in the Fallout Zone, EcoNoMIsr, Jan. 7, 1995, at 59; Norris, Mexican
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1991-94 did not result in a sense for the average person of being ap-
preciably better off. Unless a significant part of the citizenry under-
stands and accepts that the benign face of open access to the
international capital markets will occasionally wear a harsher - per-
haps even a punitive - aspect, a return to economic populism will
remain a brooding concern.
